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26 September 1960

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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26 SEPTEMBER 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev concentrating on disarmament issue to offset adverse reaction to his proposal for UN reorganization. ①

USSR plans a repeat of Gorky's "A Day in the World" on 27 September. ②

II. ASIA-AFRICA


Ghana wants Communist China to join in sponsoring conference on nonnuclear powers. ③

South Korea--Growing interest in status-of-forces agreement with US. ④

Afghan premier sees serious situation on Pakistani-Afghan border. ⑤

Mobutu to try to "impose a reconciliation" on Lumumba and Kasavubu. ⑥


Turkey--Turkes' "withdrawal" as under secretary to prime minister may indicate cleavage in Committee of National Union. ⑦

**III. THE WEST**

⑧ Icelandic Communists and other extremists call for demonstrations to influence scheduled talks with Britain on fishing limits.

LATE ITEM

⑨ Situation in Laos.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

SI RMB

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UN: In an effort to offset the adverse reaction to his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office with a three-man "collective executive body," Khrushchev now is linking a solution of the disarmament question to the adoption of his proposal. Having failed to win significant Asian-African support for Soviet attacks on Hammarskjold's handling of the Congo crisis, Khrushchev now is trying to prevent the uproar caused by his proposal to revamp the UN machinery from overshadowing his heavy emphasis on anticolonialism, which he hopes will gain Asian-African support for Soviet positions on other issues. (Page 1)

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now reads. "keeping
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USSR: Radio Moscow has announced plans to mark 27 September as "A Day in the World" in commemoration of a similar effort sparked 25 years ago by Maxim Gorky. All listeners over the world have been invited to submit accounts of their activities on that day. These will be incorporated in a special 24-hour broadcast designed to "create jointly a truthful picture of one day, 27 September," and the results will later be published in a book. This appears to be little more than a propaganda splurge. However, with Khrushchev at the UN and the Sibir range-instrumentation vessels still in the Pacific, it could provide the occasion for some startling political initiative or for a new spectacular space effort.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Ghana - Communist China: In another effort to establish itself as a spokesman for the Afro-Asian bloc, Ghana has drafted a proposal for a conference of all nonnuclear powers which, in an endeavor to "re-establish peaceful conditions in the world," would attempt to set up a "world-wide nonnuclear association." *W*

[redacted] a letter to Communist China proposing that it join with Ghana in sponsoring the conference. In responding to such an approach, Peiping would be posed with the problem of choosing between its desire to become a nuclear power and its efforts to strengthen its ties with Afro-Asian neutralists. [redacted]

South Korea: The recent resurgence of Korean interest in a status-of-forces agreement with the United States could provide a focal point for the nationalistic sentiment that has been evident since the April revolution. Some Democratic members of the National Assembly are pressing the government for action, and Korean employees of US military installations have launched a campaign for a million signatures on a petition calling for early conclusion of such an agreement. Prime Minister Chang Myon, faced with mounting difficulties on other problems, may seek popular support by publicly pushing for an agreement. [redacted]

[redacted] Seoul is compiling data to support its request that the US pay \$430,000,000 rental for use of military installations in South Korea. [redacted]

(Page 4)

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border tension is growing as Afghan Army reinforcements move closer to the scene of recent Push-toon tribal fighting along the northern sector of the frontier. Premier Daud, in informing Ambassador Byroade on 24 September of the "serious situation," stated that Afghan Army units being moved up to the border have already been involved in "skirmishes" with Pakistani "sympathizers"--presumably tribal elements inside Afghanistan who oppose the entry of government troops into their territory. The danger of clashes

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between regular army forces on either side will increase as both Kabul and Rawalpindi take measures to support their tribal partisans, although efforts probably will be made to keep the disturbances localized. []

Congo: Factions in Leopoldville are continuing their inconclusive maneuvering. The two Lumumba advisers whom Mobutu had arrested on 23 September were released on 24 September, despite reliable reports that they had been involved in a plot to stir up the troops in nearby Camp Leopold against Mobutu. Mobutu's efforts to arrest Lumumba have been frustrated by UN troops, who apparently are acting on the orders of Rajeshwar Dayal, the chief UN official in the Congo. []

[] would prevent any attempt to arrest Lumumba and further stated that he was convinced that the "peace of the country" requires a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu. Possibly in recognition of the pressure being applied by Dayal and by the African states, Mobutu stated on 24 September that he would try to "impose a reconciliation" on the two factions. w

In southeastern Congo, the UN forces have had little success in putting down tribal warfare, although the military ceasefire along the Katanga border is apparently at least partly effective. Tension is rising among elements of the central government's army in Kasai, which, in addition to being unpaid and poorly fed, has withdrawn from conflict to a large extent and is no longer effectively employed. A few minor incidents already have occurred at Port Franqui, Kindu, and other points of army concentration. []

*Turkey: [] The "withdrawal" of Colonel Alparslan Turkes from his position of under secretary to the prime minister on 22 September probably reflects a growing cleavage within the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) between a group of ambitious nationalistic young officers and a larger conservative element. As close adviser to General Gursel, chairman of the CNU and interim chief of state, Turkes has attracted ok

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[growing resentment within the committee. Lt. Gen. Madanoglu, another strong figure in the CNU, appears to be Turkes' leading antagonist.] (Page 5)

III. THE WEST

Iceland-UK: [The announcement by the Icelandic Foreign Ministry that it will begin talks with Britain on the fisheries dispute on 1 October has triggered a call by Icelandic Communists and other extremists for demonstrations against any compromise on Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit. These groups hope to maintain this irritant in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO by preventing a settlement; they also hope to discredit the government by portraying its willingness to negotiate as being a sell-out of Iceland's interests. The central issue in the negotiations probably will be the period of time in which British and other fishing interests will be permitted to phase out their operations inside the 12-mile limit.] (Page 6)

LATE ITEM

*Laos: Pressures are mounting on General Phoumi, leader of the Savannakhet Revoultionary Committee, to agree to a meeting in Luang Prabang of military commanders representing both his group and the Souvanna Phouma government.

[redacted] urging that he attend the meeting. King Savang, meanwhile, is reportedly becoming increasingly vexed with Phoumi, and is said to be considering branding him a rebel if he continues much longer in his refusal to come to Luang Prabang. The status of the Phoumi force which was driven from Paksane by Captain Kong Le's paratroopers and other elements loyal to Vientiane is the subject of conflicting reports, but the bulk of the force has apparently been incorporated in the new defense line organized about 20 miles east of Paksane.

[redacted] ordered the Vientiane troops to establish themselves in blocking positions in front of Phoumi's line, but to refrain from pressing their offensive further. (Page 7)

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Brief

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Khrushchev Links Plan for Revamping UN Machinery
To Disarmament

Khrushchev's press conference remarks on 24 September reflect his concern that the widespread adverse reaction to his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office with a three-man "collective executive body" threatens to overshadow and jeopardize the USSR's bid to gain the support and sympathy of the Asian-African nations by exploiting the Congo issue and anticolonialism in general. Having failed to win significant Asian-African support for his attacks on Hammarskjold's handling of the Congo situation, Khrushchev shifted to the disarmament problem to justify his proposal to revamp the UN machinery. He told his press conference that unless his proposal is adopted, "we will be unable to solve the disarmament question" because it would be impossible to have an international armed force, established in accordance with a disarmament treaty, under the command of Hammarskjold.

Khrushchev insisted that he was not attacking the secretary general personally and that the USSR was seeking only "better organizational forms" to assure "true peaceful coexistence" and impartiality that would protect the interests of all nations. Soviet concern over the uproar that greeted Khrushchev's proposal was also evident in press reports that Soviet diplomats at the UN are stressing that Khrushchev had made "no formal proposals" and that his plan to replace the secretary general by an executive committee was merely a "suggestion."

The concept of a three-man executive body composed of representatives of the West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralist nations probably was intended to serve the double purpose of winning favor with the uncommitted states and indicating the USSR's extreme displeasure with Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo crisis. It is unlikely that the Soviet leaders had any serious expectation of gaining acceptance of this plan or that they intend to press their proposal to a vote in the General Assembly.

Khrushchev's heavy emphasis on the "final elimination of colonialism" in his speech to the General Assembly on 23 September was designed not only to win Asian-African support and

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mobilize the uncommitted nations on behalf of Soviet positions on other issues, but also to strengthen the USSR's hand in dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute. Peiping has given the speech terse, factual treatment in broadcasts beamed abroad but has almost entirely ignored it in broadcasts to the domestic audience. President Nkrumah's address, in contrast, was accorded extensive coverage.

Khrushchev's speech did not contain any major changes in Soviet positions on outstanding East-West issues. After making the expected indictment of United States policy, he restated the Soviet proposals of 2 June on general and complete disarmament, moving a reduction of conventional forces from the second to the first stage in order to "take into account the wishes of some Western powers." He also proposed that an undefined number of neutral nations should participate in the next round of disarmament negotiations.

On the questions of Germany and Berlin, Khrushchev reaffirmed his post-summit position that the USSR will "wait awhile with the solution of the question of a German peace treaty" and seek agreement with the West at another summit conference "in a few months' time."

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~~SECRET~~Soviet Radio to Observe "A Day in the World"

Radio Moscow has announced plans to observe 27 September as "A Day in the World." Letters have been sent to certain prominent individuals, and a general invitation has been issued to all listeners throughout the world to submit accounts of their activities on that day. The results will be broadcast in a 24-hour special program and will appear later in book form.

This effort, undertaken jointly by the all-Union radio and the official government organ *Izvestia*, will commemorate a similar program which was broadcast on 27 September 1935 and published several months later as Maxim Gorky's book A Day in the World. Gorky's work covered the events of 27 September 1935 on a country-by-country basis; the United States was featured as a "land of contrasts" between monopoly capital and the working class and between liberal and extreme conservative political positions. Much attention was given to the work of the American Communist party and other left-wing political and social groups.

Radio Moscow's focus on the "events and problems which are stirring mankind" and its appeal to listeners for aid in creating a "truthful picture" of 27 September suggest that the current effort will result in a stock propaganda barrage on the growing strength of the "socialist camp and the working-class movement."

It is possible, however, that Khrushchev will take advantage of the planned events by presenting some dramatic new diplomatic initiative at the United Nations. Another possibility is a space effort; the Sibir range-instrumentation ships are still in the Pacific where they could support an earth satellite or space venture. When talking to newsmen yesterday, Khrushchev said that the USSR has not yet attempted to launch a man into space, but "we have both the rockets and the space ship in which a man can be sent aloft."

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[redacted] a "very noticeable resurgence" of Korean interest in a status-of-forces agreement with the United States and warns that the issue could become a focal point for the nationalistic sentiment which has been evident since the April revolution. The government desires a full status-of-forces agreement, including criminal jurisdiction over off-duty American servicemen, as the only arrangement compatible with its national dignity. These desires are being strengthened by recent changes in the US-Japan status-of-forces arrangements and prospects for an arrangement now being negotiated with National China.

Some Democratic members of the National Assembly, attentive to heavy press comment on the issue, are pushing for government action, and Korean employees of US military installations have launched a campaign for a million signatures on a petition calling for early conclusion of such an agreement. The early conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement was included among the demands of student demonstrators in Seoul on 24 September.

Prime Minister Chang Myon has indicated that his government is under compulsion to demonstrate progress toward this goal, and the embassy cautions that faced with mounting difficulties on other problems Chang may elect to popularize his administration by publicly pushing for an agreement. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong-sik [redacted] believed pressure on this issue could be largely relieved if negotiations were begun, despite the fact that a final agreement might require many months, as Chang's government could take considerable credit for merely opening formal talks. [redacted]

[redacted]
the Chang government is compiling data to support its request that the United States pay \$430,000,000 for claims covering American occupancy of private and government-owned real estate as well as for supplies and services since 1950. It is not yet clear whether the government will push for collection on these exaggerated claims, but it may in any case continue to use them as a bargaining counter. [redacted]

[redacted]

Dissension Appears Within Turkish Military Regime

The resignation of Col. Alparslan Turkes on 23 September from his prominent position as under secretary to Prime Minister Gursel appears to reflect a growing cleavage within the Committee of National Union, (CNU). Turkes, who has attracted the ambitious nationalistic young members of the CNU, has been outspoken against the Republican Peoples party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu and is reported to have political ambitions of his own. The Turkes faction, probably no more than one fourth of the committee's membership, has irritated the majority, which favors early restoration of normal civil government.

Turkes' major antagonist within the committee is Lt. Gen. Cemal Madanoglu, an influential member of the CNU who appears to favor the RPP. There have been suggestions that if a struggle for power within the government should develop it would be between Turkes and Madanoglu.

Madanoglu has served in the committee as a counterbalance to Turkes, described as a dangerous man because of his political ambitions and his influence on General Gursel. In a recent committee meeting, Madanoglu is reported to have warned Turkes that if he did not desist from his vociferous opposition to Inonu and conform to CNU thinking "I someday will personally see that you are hanged." Madanoglu has also allegedly threatened that if Turkes veers further away from CNU principles or becomes too active politically, the CNU will "strip him of his uniform first and then get rid of him."

Turkes submitted his resignation while most of the members of the CNU were touring the provinces explaining the background of the revolution and surveying popular reactions. He may have been making a bid for the support of those members who remained in Ankara. Those who met to discuss the resignation are reported to have suggested that Turkes become prime minister, with Gursel remaining as head of state. The Turkish home service announcement of the resignation explained that it had been necessary because of Turkes' increasing duties within the committee.

The military regime is entering a critical period during which the former leaders of government will be tried, a new constitution and electoral law must be presented to the people, elections are to be held, and a new constituent assembly chosen.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Iceland and Britain to Open Talks on Fisheries Dispute

The Icelandic Foreign Ministry announcement on 21 September that talks with Britain on the fishing limits dispute will open on 1 October in Reykjavik has triggered a call by Icelandic Communists and other extremists for popular demonstrations against any compromise on the 12-mile fishing limits. Last August Prime Minister Thors' Conservative-Social Democratic government agreed to undertake negotiations on this controversial issue, which has threatened several times to disrupt relations between the two countries. As a conciliatory gesture, British fishing interests at that time agreed to extend to 13 October their temporary compliance with the 12-mile limit in order that the talks might be held in a calm atmosphere.

This issue overshadows all others on the Icelandic political scene, and the Thors government has little room for maneuver because it maintains that the 12-mile-fishing-limit principle is not a subject for negotiation. The British have indicated their willingness to respect Iceland's unilaterally extended fishing limits provided they are able to phase out their operations within the disputed waters over a period of years. A central issue in the talks is likely to be the period of time during which British and other fishing interests claiming "historic rights" will be permitted to continue to fish within the new boundaries.

The Thors government's caution on this issue is dictated by the intense activity of the Communists and other extremist groups which have pictured the government's willingness to negotiate as a sell-out of Iceland's interests. They want to maintain tensions in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO and to discredit the Conservatives and Social Democrats for their role in favoring talks with Britain. As the date for opening the talks approaches, the Communists probably will organize mass demonstrations in an effort to mobilize opinion against any compromise settlement and to force the government to retreat on this issue.

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~~SECRET~~The Situation in Laos

Pressures are mounting on General Phoumi, leader of the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, to agree to a meeting in Luang Prabang of military commanders representing both his group and the Souvanna Phouma government in Vientiane.

urging him to go to Luang Prabang. Sarit argued that the only way for Phoumi to carry out his anti-Communist work was to do it legally, and that Phoumi must therefore obtain King Savang's approval. Savang, meanwhile, is reportedly becoming increasingly vexed with Phoumi and is said to be considering branding Phoumi a rebel if he continues for more than a few days his refusal to come to Luang Prabang.

The King has issued invitations for a military commanders' conference twice during the past week and been rebuffed by Phoumi on both occasions. Phoumi has professed willingness to attend such a conference, but has insisted on some venue other than the royal capital. While the projected conference has as its ostensible aim the reunification of the Laotian army, now split between Vientiane and Savannakhet, the King clearly hopes that it will lead to Souvanna's resignation and the formation of a new government embracing the rival camps. Commanders loyal to Souvanna--notably General Ouane, the armed forces commander--have indicated their willingness to attend the conference. They have reportedly sought to broaden participation in the conference, however, in an obvious effort to overcome the voting majority which the Phoumi group would probably enjoy under the present plans.

This status of the Phoumi force of about three battalions which was driven from Paksane on 22 September is the subject of conflicting reports. Some of the troops may have taken refuge in Thailand, and Vientiane has made the probably exaggerated claim that several hundred have "rallied" to the Souvanna government. The bulk of the force, however, has apparently been incorporated in the new defense line organized about 20 miles east of Paksane.

ordered the Vientiane troops--

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comprising Captain Kong Le's paratroopers and other elements--
to establish themselves in blocking positions before Phoumi's
line, but to refrain from pressing their offensive further, in
order "to keep their strength concentrated and less vulnerable."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**THE PRESIDENT****The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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